I am a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Denison University in Granville, OH. I have previously taught in the Department of Philosophy and the Honors College at The University of South Florida (where I just finished my Ph.D.), and at the University of Tampa. This site was created to serve as an online source of information for my students and for colleagues.
Areas of Specialization:
History of Early Analytic Philosophy (esp. Wittgenstein)
Critical Social Theory (esp. Marxism and Feminism)
Areas of Competence:
Logic, History of 19th Century Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Contemporary Continental Philosophy
Other Things I like to Think About:
Critiques of Empiricism, Semantic Normativity, Philosophy of Mathematics, Economic Theory, Modern Philosophy, Computer Ethics, Metaphilosophy, French Social theory (Althusser, Baudrillard, Foucault), Teaching Pedagogy, Philosophy and Literature
Hobbies
Linux, Coffee, Music, Open Source Software, Domestic and International Politics
Current topics of Research:
Three Wittgensteins – There have been three major interpretations of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus since its initial publication in 1921. In this essay, I present each and critically analyze them to assess which one is the 'right' interpretation (if there ever is such a thing). The first, which I refer to as the 'Positivist reading' understands the Tractatus as a neo-positivist text, in harmony with the philosophical position of the Vienna Circle. The second, which I refer to as the 'standard reading,' draws upon the drawbacks of the positivist interpretation. According to this second understanding of the text, Wittgenstein is a indeed a metaphysician of a very specific type. The so-called 'realist' and 'anti-realist' standard readings are analyzed, and the tensions between them diagnosed. The last of which is Diamond and Conant's 'resolute reading,' that takes Wittgenstein seriously at 6.54 that all of his propositions are indeed nonsense [Unsinnig], but nevertheless elucidatory. The last interpretation denies that Wittgenstein was making any substantive philosophical contributions in his text, but his goal (in harmony with the 'later' Wittgenstein) is therapeutic: to rid us of philosophical confusions. This essay, when completed, will be submitted as my doctoral thesis.
Other research projects in developmental stages are:
- Hegelianism and Analytic Philosophy: When Moore and Russell defined 'analytic philosophy,' it was largely in opposition to the Hegelian tradition, especially in England. Russell and Moore both studied with professors at Cambridge in this tradition, and their earliest publications attest to its influence. It is believed that the development of the new logic of Principia Mathematica led them to reject several key idealist doctrines, such as the connection between act of cognition and object, as well as internal relations. I would like to study these arguments in more depth. In addition, there has recently been a rise of Hegelian analytic philosophy, in such figures as Sellars, McDowell and Brandom. So what exactly is the connection between the rejection of idealism and analytic philosophy? If Russell and Moore's version of analytic philosophy is incompatible with Hegelian idealism, and contemporary analytic philosophers are using Hegelian themes, then several interesting solutions present themselves: Is the long standing believe that analytic philosophy is incompatible with Hegelianism false? Is McDowell and Brandom's version of analytic philosophy substantively different than Russell and Moore's? What does Hegelian anayltic philosophy mean? etc.
- An introductory textbook for logic classes: The best book on the market for undergraduate logic classes, in my opinion, is Paul Tomassi's Logic. It is based on the Lemmon book Beginning Logic, which uses the same intuitive (and compact!) Genzen-style rule set, and proof system which charts assumptions through the proof. In many ways, the late Tomassi's book is an improvement from its predecessor--which was short on exercise problems, and rather dense and inaccesible to students (especially those 'filling a requirement'). I have found great success using Prof. Tomassi's book, but teaching it now over the past five years has also led me to question some of its idiosyncracies. Although it has many references to the history of logic generously scattered, there is no extended discussion of syllogistic logic. I tend to teach a different version of the subproof prodecedure, and I find some of his conventions (especially the vE rule, or 'proof by cases') cumbersome and unintuitive. I'd like to write a book amending some of these defects. I know that there is a wealth of textbooks on the market, but in my opinion there is always need for another good one. (If anyone from Routledge is reading this and would be intersted in doing a second edition of Tomassi, let me know).